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1. Introduction“A contradiction is false. It is false everywhere and always. It is false in hell. It is falsein heaven. It is even false in theology.” With these words, a distinguished philosopherbegan a lecture to a group of divinity school students. Accustomed to quick and easyappeals to “mystery,” the theology students and aspiring pastors before him wererather taken aback, but this statement reflects a view that is not uncommon amongphilosophers. Indeed, Graham Priest (et al. 2018) refers to classical logic and itscommitment to the principles of non-contradiction and excluded middle as“orthodoxy.”But in his fascinating essay “Christ – a Contradiction,” Jc Beall wields theresources of subclassical (or paraconsistent) logic in defense of ChalcedonianChristology. The past few decades have seen much ink spilled and many trees killedin arguments over the coherence of orthodox Christology (happily, this is an open-access electronic journal, so no trees were harmed in the making of this essay). Criticssuch as John Hick have made the case that “to say, without further explanation, thatthe historical Jesus of Nazareth was also God is as devoid of meaning as to say thatthis circle drawn with a pencil on paper is also a square” (1977, 178). Analyticphilosophers of religion and theologians have risen to challenges such as that raisedby Hick, and different proposals have been developed (or retrieved from thetradition) and defended against objections. We now have various combinations ofmetaphysics and doctrine: we have two-minds proposals with either abstractist orconcretist metaphysics, we have both abstractist and concretist kenotic accounts onoffer, we have “Model A’s” and “Model T’s.” But for all the creativity and variety, whatsuch proposals share in common is the commitment to demonstrate thatChalcedonian or, a bit more broadly, “conciliar” Christology is not contradictory. Inother words, these proposals seek to show that there is no logical contradictionbetween the admittedly striking affirmations made by the creeds – and thus theChristology of the creeds should not be rejected on the grounds that it is necessarilyfalse. Beall takes a different approach. Indeed, it is a very different approach: hedefends “the viability of ‘Contradictory Christology’” by arguing that “the rightresponse to the fundamental problem of Christology (viz., Christ’s having twoapparently complementary – contradiction-entailing – natures) is to accept thefamiliar contradictions” (401). I am not yet persuaded that such a move is either
Doctrinal Orthodoxy and Philosophical Heresy Thomas McCall
474
viable or necessary; I am not convinced that the kind of work done in analyticChristology is unsuccessful (and thus that Christians need to resort to paraconsistentlogics), and I am not sold on either the necessity or viability of the paraconsistentlogics that call for exceptions to the law of non-contradiction. But such issues as theviability of more traditional Christological proposals or the debates over classicallogic are not the focus of this discussion, and at any rate Beall offers an importantoption for thinking about the doctrine of the incarnation. He does so with verve,clarity, and rigor, and his proposal raises some fascinating and important issues. Inwhat follows I shall make some observations about, and raise some questions for, hisdiscussion of the role of logic – and especially the place of contradictions – in theology.I do so as a theologian, and I do so with attentiveness to the potential reception of hisproposal by theologians.
2. Seeking Clarity: The Role of Logic in TheologyAs a theologian, I find myself in hearty agreement with much of what Beall says aboutthe role of logic in theology. He notes that any theory (in whatever field of inquiry)will include the (initial) truths that are basic to the theory and that motivate thattheory. But any theory that strives for completeness and adequacy will also include“whatever follows from the truths in the theory; it should contain all of the
consequences of a theory’s claims” (403). Logic sorts out these relations ofconsequence; it helps us see what does – and what does not – follow from the first-order truth claims of the theory itself. I welcome much of what Beall says here, forlogic has an important role to play in theology. As John Wesley – who is somewhatmore renowned as an evangelist than a logician – puts it, logic is “necessary next to,and in order to, the knowledge of Scripture” (1959, 483). Despite the fact that it wasconsidered “unfashionable” among the clergy of his time, nonetheless logic isinvaluable. For with it we have the possibility of “apprehending things clearly, judgingtruly, and reasoning conclusively” (483). Logic “is good for this at least (wherever itis understood), to make people talk less; by showing them both what is, and what isnot, to the point; and how extremely hard it is to prove anything” (492).Beall insists that “theology is no different” from other disciplines in thisrespect (404). Logic is rightly said to be “‘universal’ and ‘topic-neutral,’” and thus itincludes theology (405). I could not agree more. Systematic theology is ultimatelyabout God, but it is also about all else as that “all else” relates to God (see, for example,Webster 2009). As such, it includes not only core claims about God and the world butalso whatever is entailed by those core claims. Thus “theologians must not only addvarious basic truths about God but also ‘complete’ (as far as possible) the theory viaa consequence relation” (404). Accordingly, theologians should include in theirtheories not only those truths that they take to be revealed by God but also whattruths of theological relevance really follow from those revealed truths.1 They should
1 I say “what truths of theological relevance” because I think that Beall’s way of putting matterscommits us to too much. Every necessary truth follows from any truth, but surely systematic theologyshouldn’t have to include all of that to be complete. The task of systematic theology is daunting enough
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recognize that the entailments of what they affirm are also included in their doctrinalproposals.This may seem obvious, but I am grateful for Beall’s insistence here, and I hopethat theologians will be properly appreciative of this point. For in modern andcontemporary theology (in sharp contrast to much theology in the Christiantradition) it is sometimes too easy to find theologians making claims about the“implications” of some doctrinal proposal – either positively or negatively – withoutdoing the hard work of seeing just what is implied or entailed. In other words, it is notuncommon to see theologians rush to celebrate the (desired) “implications” of somepet doctrinal proposal – but without pausing to demonstrate that the desiredconclusions indeed are implied or entailed. Similarly, it is not hard to find theologiansmake affirmations and then deny the (undesired) implications; it is almost as if theoperative assumption is that there are no such consequences if we do not want thoseconsequences. A theologian may affirm some tenet of classical orthodoxy and thenalso affirm some other propositions that would entail the contradiction of that tenet– but then insist that there is no problem because they do not intend to affirm thecontradictory proposition. But it is one thing to affirm some proposition A and denysome proposition B. It is another thing entirely to affirm some proposition A and denysome proposition B while also affirming some proposition C – when C entails thedenial of A and/or the affirmation of B.2Beall concludes that “without a consequence (closure) relation our theoriesremain inadequate; they fail to contain truths that are entailed by the given set oftruths. Inasmuch as theorists, and theologians in particular, aim to give as complete atheory of the target phenomenon as possible, the reliance of a consequence relationfor our theory is required” (404). Beall is right that any theological theory shouldinclude whatever is entailed by the given set of truths. Amen – logic has an importantrole to play in theology, and theologians would do well to recognize this. As someoneimportant in theology once said, “Come, let us reason together” (Isaiah 1:18).But just what, more precisely, is the role of logic? Beall is unmistakably clearthat it helps us trace consequences. But what does this mean, and does it do more?Logic (at least as it is classically understood) is invaluable in demonstrating whatfollows from a proposition (and that proposition’s conjunction with otherpropositions), what comes “downstream” of a set of claims, what comes as anentailment whether we want it or not. But is this all that it can do? Or can it makemore substantive contributions to theology? More directly to the issue at hand, logiccan show where contradiction follows as a consequence. But does logic also show usthat those contradictions are false – does it show that they are false simply in virtueof being contradictions? Here we see with clarity how Beall’s view takes leave ofclassical logic – on Beall’s account, logic itself does not show that contradictions arefalse. Various contradictions may in fact be false, and indeed Beall is insistent thatthey should not be accepted widely in theology. But logic itself does not rule outcontradictions, and it leaves open the door to the possibility that some may in fact be
– and the textbooks long enough – without also having to include “God is triune and 2+2=4" and “Godis triune or 2+2-4.” Thanks to Tim Pawl for very helpful conversation here.2 As Keith E. Yandell and I argued in McCall and Yandell 2009, 357.
Doctrinal Orthodoxy and Philosophical Heresy Thomas McCall
476
true (and, indeed, one contradiction – the set of claims contained in orthodoxChristology – is true).
3. Looking for Charity: The Role of Logic in Pro-Conciliar
TheologySo what are we make of the apparent contradictions in the creeds and conciliarstatements? Beall notes that Timothy Pawl makes the case that it is “at bestuncharitable to interpret the conciliar fathers as advancing anything close to agenuinely contradictory Christology” (420). On Pawl’s account (and I think that wecould extend this beyond Pawl to other analytic apostles of Christian orthodoxy), itwould be uncharitable to do so because this would mean that the conciliar fatherswere asserting things that cannot even possibly be true (see Pawl 2016, 84–85). So,for the sake of charity, we should interpret them as making claims about apparentcontradictions. Beall disagrees. In fact, he charges Pawl with an uncharitable readingbecause Pawl’s account has the conciliar fathers using the “key predicates in non-standard and undefined ways” (420). So both Pawl and Beall want to promote acharitable reading. Neither, so far as I can see, wants to read the creedal statementsin such a way that implies that the conciliar fathers were simply incoherent, andneither wants a reading that is implausible. Thus Pawl assumes that they were notasserting something they took to be a genuine contradiction, and thus Beall assumesthat they really meant to affirm the contradictions (since they just asserted themwithout making the sophisticated “Pawline” moves or watering them down). Bothwant a charitable reading. But they disagree about what that is.Here are some observations. First, I take it that the creedal statements wereintended neither, on the one hand, as mere “grammatical rules” or “linguisticregulation” (with no metaphysical commitments or constraints whatsoever), nor, onthe other hand, as more-or-less complete explanations of the incarnation.3 Bothreadings are, in my view, both uncharitable and quite implausible. I think that it ismuch better to think of the creedal statements as both making central affirmations(“here is what we must hold”) and crucial denials (“here is what we can’t believe”) –and then as leaving interpretive space for various possibilities and metaphysicaldevelopment between the core of what we must hold and the boundaries beyondwhich we cannot go. If I am correct, then we should not expect them to make explicittheir metaphysical and logical commitments as part of the creeds (or even asaddendums).Second, it seems to me that the any charitable reading will be one that allowsfor the possibility of coherence while not being historically implausible. So if we havereason to think that the framers and defenders of the conciliar statements werethinking along the lines of Beall’s subclassical proposal, then interpreting them asmaking claims that they knew were directly contradictory might be the charitableway to go. But in the absence of such reasons, it becomes less plausible. And, if less
3 The phrase “linguistic regulation” is taken from Coakley 2002, 143–163.
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plausible, then it is also less charitable, for then we are interpreting them as makingovert contradictions – while also believing contradictions to be false.So do we have such reasons? Commenting on the philosophical history,Nicholas Rescher and Robert Brandom note thatSince Aristotle’s day, virtually all logicians and logically concernedphilosophers in the mainstream Western tradition have had a phobiaof inconsistency. They have been near to unanimous in proscribing itfrom the precincts of their logical and ontological theorizing, holdingthat the toleration of inconsistencies would inevitably bring cognitivedisaster in its wake (1979, 1).This may be true of the philosophical history, but, not surprisingly, it is also true ofthe theological history. As Ephraim Radner points out,Almost all the Fathers were wary of affirming that Scripture had withinitself real “contradictions,” a charge associated with the enemies ofScripture. And much effort was made to explain the presence of such
apparent tensions within the texts (2016, 218).What they took to be true about claims made within the text of Scripture they alsotook to be true more broadly. Thus, for example, Gregory of Nyssa relies upon both“the law of excluded middle” and “the law of non-contradiction” in his debates withEunomius of Cyzicus. Indeed, he claims that “contraries of contradictories arethemselves contradictory of each other,” and that “it is always a true axiom, that twothings which are naturally opposed to two things mutually opposite are themselvesopposed to each other,” and he then presses these axioms into service in a reductioargument against the Eunomians (see “Against Eunomius,” 1.42). With directreference to Chalcedon, Coakley concurs:In a broadly accepted sense, the Chalcedonian “Definition” does indeedinvolve a “paradoxical” claim – the claim that “God” and “man,”normally perceived as strikingly different in defining characteristics,find in Christ a unique intersection. Here “paradox” simply means“contrary to expectation,” and the mind is led on from there to eke outan explanation that can satisfy both logic and tradition. However, weshould be careful to distinguish this meaning of “paradox” from atighter one in which not merely something “contrary to expectation” issuggested, but something self-contradictory. . . The overwhelmingimpression from following the debate leading up to Chalcedon,however, as well as that which succeeds it, is that the “paradoxical”nature of the incarnation in the first sense is embraced (with greater orlesser degrees of enthusiasm), but that “paradox” in the latter sense isvigorously warded off (2002, 154–155).
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If this is right (and I think that it is), then the efforts of Pawl (and his fellow apostles)should be seen as a kind of “eking out” effort. Pawl’s is not the first such effort, andindeed it has a great deal of both formal and material continuity with importanttheologians within the Christian tradition. As such, it is neither uncharitable norimplausible.
4. Hoping for Rarity: Contradictions Galore?Beall rightly anticipates a “very common reaction” to his proposal (416). He wants tomake it clear that he is not “proposing that theologians should seek to findcontradictions willy nilly;” he is not suggesting “that theologians ought to seek outcontradictions” (416). There is good reason, he insists, for us to reject most logicalcontradictions as false. True logical contradictions are very rare, for many are ruledout by the objects of inquiry themselves. His proposal, again, is that it is only on stateoccasions – notably, for our purposes, the incarnation – that the truth might requirea genuine contradiction. He does not want to completely “rule out” the possibility thatthere may be other true contradictions in theology, but he clearly does not intend forthis to be taken as license (422).Beall’s own preferences are clear enough, but I am not sanguine about theirreception among theologians. I worry that many theologians will indeed take whatBeall says as open season on the constraints of classical logic and, more importantly,to license contradictions galore.4 It is not hard to imagine a theologian beingconvinced by Beall and then saying, “Cool, I no longer need to worry about avoidingcontradictions.” Beall might remonstrate with “No, you theologians should not ‘seekout contradictions’” (416). But the theologian’s response is quick: “look, we don’thave to seek them out – they are all over the place and come looking for us. They areunavoidable. The good news now is that we don’t need to worry about them.”My worry, in other words, is that contemporary theologians might take Beallseriously – too seriously. Beall says that “until there’s good reason to accept that ourtrue theories of phenomena beyond Christ are likewise glutty I see no reason not toreject the spread of contradictory theories” (419). But a theologian converted toBeall’s position may wonder what reasons there might be not to accept the spread ofsuch theories. Contradictions will be seen as delightfully if perhaps recklesslymischievous – but will become dangerously promiscuous. Not only will logic intheology be “gappy” (where the “law of excluded middle” is rejected and theproposition may be neither true nor false) and “glutty” (where the “law ofcontradiction” is rejected and the proposition may be both true and false), it will alsobe overly promiscuous.While some theologians might welcome and cheer such a development, othersmay be concerned about the proliferation of contradictions. Indeed, some – perhapsstill under the spell of “classical logic” – may fear that to allow one genuine
4 Ephraim Radner discusses several recent (and not-so-recent) theologians (most notably PavelFlorensky and Vladimir Lossky) who make explicit and positive use of contradiction, and he referencesthe work of Graham Priest. See Radner 2016, 216–219, and Florensky 1997, 106–123.
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contradiction as true is to embrace all falsehoods. They would see that this would bevery bad news indeed for theology because it would open the door to all falsehoodsboth contingent and necessary. Beall denies “explosion” as a consequence of logicitself while allowing that it might be a part of theory-specific consequence relations(e.g., 428), and he quite understandably says that detailed discussion of such mattersis beyond the scope of the essay. Fair enough, but at some point something furtherneeds to be said about this if his proposal about logic in theology is to be helpful totheologians. For as matters stand, it is less than fully obvious why we should notconclude “ex contradictione quodlibet” (roughly, very roughly, “out of contradiction,whatever the heck”).I take it that it is safe to assume that Beall has much more to say about suchmatters (indeed, I take this to be an assumption safer than which is difficult toconceive). Assuming further that his explanations here turn out to be satisfactory, hisproposal still raises further questions. It is entirely understandable that these are notthe concern of his paper, but the answers will be important nonetheless whenconsidering the reception of his work among theologians and especially inconsidering its utility for ecclesial theology.
5. Some Questions for Contradictory ChristologyBeall’s proposal is intriguing at several points, and it raises some importantquestions. I take it that these questions will be important when theologians considerthe adequacy and helpfulness of his proposal. I focus on several here.The first question is epistemological: how are we to know which are the “true”contradictions and which are the false? The theologian who makes do with the shop-worn old tools of classical logic and theology has a ready and easy answer: there areno “true” contradictions. If something is genuinely – and not just apparently –contradictory, then it just is false. Sorting out the apparent contradictions from thosethat are genuine is the hard work, but once we get clear on that the work is easy (orat least easier). Once sorted, the genuine contradictions are rejected as false. But onBeall’s proposal, the hard work may come after the initial sorting exercises; once thegenuine contradictions are separated from those that are merely apparent, roundedup, and corralled together, the really hard work begins. For now we have to sort outthe “true” contradictions and quarantine them off from their sickly false cousins. Andhow are we supposed to do that? Again, it is entirely understandable that Beall doesnot supply us with the needed tools and methods here, but at some point thatassistance will be crucial if his proposal is going to have a positive impact in theology.A second question is closely related to the first: what is the level of requiredsupport that is needed to establish the truth of both claims of a contradiction? Beall’sproposal rather casually refers to “initial thrown-in truths” (e.g., 403), and hementions the affirmations of two-natures Christology as an example. But in theology,at least, matters are often somewhat more complicated than this, especially whenengaging in constructive theology but sometimes also when doing retrieval theology.If two theological propositions taken together seem to produce a contradiction, does
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that give us reason to go back and look closely at the data or evidence (whethertextual, empirical, experiential or just what) supporting the propositions? If anothernon-contradictory theory is not impossible and also makes more-or-less adequatesense of the data, is that one to enjoy a preference (at least initially)? If so, then why?Just how much support for the propositions must one have to embrace somethingthat surely is an actual contradiction? Once again, I understand that Beall cannot dealwith all such questions here (first things first), but at some point answers to suchquestions will be important if his proposal is to put down theological roots andproduce some doctrinal fruit.A third question is perhaps due only to my ignorance (as a under-informedtheologian). It concerns the relation of subclassical (or paraconsistent) logics to a setof issues that are important in theology. It is this: how does Beall’s proposal map ontoissues of modality? Issues of modality are important in theology generally and inChristology specifically, and it is not clear how Beall’s proposal impacts ourunderstanding of modality. One way of approaching this issue is to consider thefollowing proposition(T) it is possible that there is at least one true contradiction.It seems obvious that Beall is committed to (T). Now compare it with(NT) it is not possible that there is at least one true contradiction.Now consider further the conjunction of (T) and (NT). Putting them together yields(TNT)5 it is possible that there is at least one true contradiction and it is not
possible that there is at least one true contradiction.It seems obvious that (TNT) is not only about contradictions, (TNT) itself is acontradiction. But is (TNT) a true contradiction? Or does it suffer the inconvenienceof being a false contradiction?Suppose that (TNT) is true. If (TNT) is one of the true contradictions, then weare left to conclude not only that there is at least one true contradiction and that thereare no true contradictions, we are also to conclude that what is possible is alsoimpossible and even that what is necessary is also impossible. So what is true is alsofalse, and what is necessarily false is also true. According to S5, ◊p ⇒ □◊p. Thus the first conjunct of (TNT) cannot fail to be true if it is true at all. To put it in possibleworlds semantics, if it is true at all, then it is true in all possible worlds.6 Accordingly,there is at least one possible world where a contradiction is true, and it is true in allpossible worlds that there is at least one possible world where a contradiction is true.But the second conjunct, if true, is also necessarily true (because ~ □◊p = ~p); it is true in all possible worlds. If the second conjunct is true, then there is no world in
5 Standing, obviously, for “Whether True and/or False.”6 Beall elsewhere endorses an understanding of necessity as truth in all possible worlds, e.g., Beall andRestall 2006, 15.
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which the first conjunct is true; while if the first is true, then there is no world in whichthe second is true. Either way, there is no world in which both are true.This leaves me, as a theologian, with at least two concerns. The first is that Istruggle to know what it would even mean to say that (TNT) is true. The secondproblem is that (TNT) would seem to give us modal collapse or something even moreworrisome (perhaps modal explosion). Where “modal collapse” happens whenpossibility is “collapsed” into necessity, here it seems we have the threat of
impossibility collapsing into necessity, of necessary truth “collapsing” into necessaryfalsehood. Since I think that modality is important in theology (and that reality has amodal structure), I think that theology should be very wary of any theory with suchconsequences.Suppose, on the other hand, that (TNT) is false. If (TNT) is false, then theseconsequences do not follow. So, it seems, the obvious thing to do is to reject (TNT) asfalse. But on what basis? The classical logician will immediately recognize that (TNT)is false and will reject it as such – (TNT) is not only about contradictions, it is acontradiction. Thus it is false. It is necessarily false, and not even Chuck Norris canmake it true. There are a lot of hard problems in philosophy, but this is not one ofthem. End of story. But Beall’s theory can hardly take this route. For on his view, aswe have seen, logic is “clearly topic-neutral by not taking a stand on whether gappyor glutty sentences are ruled out” (414). With respect to some topics, it may indeedbe the case that there is no room for gluttiness (with mathematics, this clearly is thecase), while with respect to other matters, acceptance of gappiness and gluttinessmay be appropriate. The salient point is that logic itself does not decide. As Beall putsit, subclassical “logic does not force unique, strange phenomena into the crampedconfines of classical-logic possibilities” but “is silent on whether theorists shouldentertain a contradictory (glutty) theory.” The upshot is that when considering thepossibility of a true contradiction on the subclassical account, “logic itself, contrary tothe standard account, doesn’t rule it out” (414). Logic itself does not rule out (TNT).So if it is going to be eliminated, it will have to be on the basis of something theory-specific. However, in this case there is no other theory that (TNT) is about, andbecause there is no theory there are no theory-specific eliminators. The contradictionin question is straightforwardly and merely about (modal) logic – so we have neitherlogic itself nor other theory-specific criteria to guide us. If logic itself does not rule outthe possibility of a true contradiction, then logic does not rule out this one. But neitheris it obvious that anything else does (since it is a logic-only matter).Moreover, at least if I’m understanding him correctly, Beall’s view wants tomaintain space for the axioms of classical logic within it. He describes subclassicallogic (at least his preferred version of it) by saying that what it “does not do is rejectany classical-logic models;” instead it “simply expands the space of models torecognize ones that go beyond the narrow confines of the classical-logic space” (411).Since the second conjunct stems from the very classical-logical model that he wantsto include and expand around, it would seem to be included.So what are we to do with (TNT)? Rejecting the second conjunct outrightseems to be against the grain of Beall’s preferred subclassical account (committed, asit is, to inclusion of classical logic even as it expands around and beyond it). And toreject (TNT) as one of the false contradictions seems arbitrary (because logic itself
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cannot rule it out, and, as a logical matter, there is no theory-specific evidence thatwould do so). I guess we could say “so much the worse for thinking about modality.”But perhaps instead we should conclude “so much the worse for any system thatmakes it so difficult to reject something so obviously problematic.” But without goodreason to reject either conjunct – and Beall’s account is committed to the first andwithout obvious reason to reject the second (since the logic itself is neutral on theissue and we don’t see any theory-specific reasons to reject it) – we are unsure howto avoid it. So taking (TNT) as true threatens modal collapse or explosion, but Beall’ssubclassical logic leaves us unsure (pending further explanation) of how to avoid it.Either way, we have modal instability.More broadly – and more importantly – we are left to wonder about therelationship between subclassical logic (as applied to theological issues) andmodality. It is understandable that Beall does not address all such matters here; hisis, after all, an essay on Christology rather than an essay on the relationship ofsubclassical logic to modal logic. But neither is this irrelevant, for modalconsiderations are important in theology. This is true generally, and Christology is noexception. Beall’s account assumes that“Christ has a divine nature (entailing immutability) and independently
and without diminishment also has a human nature (entailingmutability).”This follows from orthodox Christology, but of course there is more to say. To theissue at hand, it is important to note that Christ has a divine nature necessarily but hasa human nature contingently (see Cross 2002, 179). Theology needs an account ofmodality adequate to handle such affirmations.Perhaps there are also good reasons for the subclassical logician to consider(TNT) to be one of the false contradictions and to reject it as such (in this case, onecan think of my worries merely as potentially common misunderstandings that arelikely to be made by theologians). Or perhaps it is the case that acceptance ofsubclassical logic will entail different understandings of modality.7 If so, then it wouldbe good to know the price; theologians should look carefully and count the cost beforeembracing it. I am confident that Beall has more to say about these matters. Butaccounting for modality in subclassical logic is not, as Beall (2010, 11) recognizes,“entirely straightforward,” so I look forward to further clarification as we seek torelate his proposals about logic to theology.A fourth and final question is more directly practical and even pastoral innature. This is a concern about the potential and even likely reception of Beall’sproposal, which is, of course something over which Beall does not have much control.Nevertheless, given the argument he makes and the enthusiasm for affirmingcontradictions that one sometimes finds among contemporary theologians who arenot as careful as Beall, there are reasons for concern. The question is this: how is theaccount drawn here to offer helpful practical guidance for Christian communities if it
7 Haack 1974 (2) sees modal logics (such as T, S4, and S5) as “supplements” to classical logic ratherthan “rivals” to it.
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is affirmed and applied more broadly? Nicholas Wolterstorff observes thattheologians often have an urge to “heal the world” (2005, 83). More broadly, theologyis (at least partially – there are debates over this) a churchly enterprise. Doctrine playsimportant roles in the formation of the community of faith and in the formation ofcharacter and the virtues within that faith community (see Charry 1997). Will theacceptance of contradictions (in this case of the doctrine of the incarnation, at thevery heart of the Christian faith, but potentially more broadly as well) actuallystrengthen the faith of the faithful and assist ecclesial communities in the importantwork in moral and spiritual formation? Or might it bring harm? Consider thefollowing scenario:The Pope and his Council of Cardinals, along with the OrthodoxPatriarchs and Metropolitans, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and therelevant Protestant ecclesial leaders, embark on an ecumenical studyof the debates over the ordination of women to the priesthood. Theyassemble the “ideal” team of scholars; they get the best theologians (ofthe various disciplines) gathered from the respective ecclesial groups.Notably, all parties agree that this is an ideal team. They lockthemselves in the basement of the Vatican with the full range ofresources. In other words, this is the All-Star team, they have all thatthey need, and they have as long as they need.Something interesting and unexpected happens. The longerthey are together, the more they become convinced that there areunassailable theological arguments for the restriction of ordination (tosome set of ecclesial offices) to males – and they become increasinglyconvinced that there are unassailable theological arguments foropening ordination (to the full set of ecclesial offices) to women.Interestingly, both the “traditionalists” and the “progressives” are insubstantial agreement on both accounts: scholars from both sides seeand affirm the strength of the arguments for both conclusions. Theyseem to be stuck, and – because they tacitly assume that a contradictioncannot be true – they keep going back to the arguments. But each timethey do so, they are even more deeply convinced of the theological caseto be made for both conclusions.Fortunately, however, the basement of the Vatican has decentinternet access, and at some point a bishop who is frustrated by thesituation seeks diversionary relief by reading the Journal of Analytic
Theology. There he comes across a brilliant article commending“Contradictory Christology,” and he is immediately taken by the ideathat subclassical logic is appropriate for theology. The next morning hemakes the case that it is appropriate for the issue before them; heargues that the only thing holding them up is this dang relic called the“Law of Non-Contradiction.” What we need, he says, is a “glutty”theology of ordained ministry. The scholars and clerics agree. In oneaccord, this ideal team of ecumenical scholars issues an importantstatement: they conclude that the ordination of women to the
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priesthood is both theologically permissible and morally obligatory
and that the ordination of women to the priesthood is boththeologically impermissible and a grave sin. Understanding that thismight be initially confusing to the catholic faithful, they include in theirstatement not only their strongest arguments for both views but also ashort primer on subclassical logic.The catholic faithful find this statement and accompanying explanations – tobe interesting but also super confusing. Indeed, they are frustrated by it, and theykeep asking this question: “But what do we do?” They begin to hope that their leadersdo not make similar progress on other contested issues. For while these sorts ofexercises might be good for ecumenism considered abstractly, they are not good atall for the life and health of the church.Christian theology attempts to tell the truth – the whole truth so far as we can– about God and all things as these are related to God. As the truth, it is supposed toshape and mold our characters (individually and communally), it is supposed to formus spiritually and morally, it is supposed to give us moral guidance. How can it do soif it includes contradictions (or even allows for their possibility)? Perhaps the answeris that there will be no true contradictions on matters with practical import; maybe itis the case that anytime there is a contradiction with respect to a practical, pastoral,or moral issue that itself is a clue that there must be some theory-specific reason tojudge the contradiction false. Maybe so, but such a criterion might threaten to rule outthe very Christological move being made by Beall. At any rate, more explanationwould be welcome indeed.
5. Concluding ObservationsI am not yet convinced that we need to resort to subclassical logic to hold to classic,conciliar Christology. I think that there are viable options to be found in the proposalsthat defend the creedal accounts while staying within the bounds of classical logic, soI do not feel the pressure to make the move that Beall is recommending. I wouldrather give up philosophical “orthodoxy” than surrender theological orthodoxy, so Iam, as a theologian, appreciative of Beall’s work in this area. But at this point I do notthink that it is the only way forward. Nor am I convinced that paraconsistent orsubclassical logics make the best sense of reality; I am not persuaded that the debatesover the “Law of Non-Contradiction” are settled in favor of its demise. But such issuesare beyond the scope of Beall’s essay, and accordingly they have not been the focus ofmy response. Instead, I have tried to voice a theologian’s concerns and raise somequestions that seem important – even where these go beyond the immediate scope ofhis essay. I have done so in hopes of raising concerns that will perhaps assist Beall inhis “larger project” as well as help theologians think through what is at stake.I say these things as a theologian – one who is very well aware that theologianshave a great deal to learn from specialists in logic and one who is appreciative of theirwork. Beall’s proposal is very stimulating. It is original (at least so far as I can see) and
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imaginative, it is well-informed, and it is rigorous and rich in argument. It is an honorto engage it. I have benefitted much from thinking through it, and I am certain thatother theologians will as well.Ibn Sina once said that “those who deny a first principle should be beaten orexposed to fire until they concede that to burn and not to burn, or to be beaten andnot to be beaten, are not identical.”8 I don’t want Christian theology (or Christiantheologians!) to take a beating, but I also do not want Christian theology to pick up atool that burns it.
8 Cited in Scotus 1987, 9. The citation is referenced to Avicenna’s Metaphysics 1.
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